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The work opens with an introduction, prepared in the author's compact and thorough way, in which the character and state of preservation of the public records, town archives, and town chronicles are discussed, with an account of the general histories of boroughs and the histories of particular towns. Dr. Gross comments on the shameful lack of care often shown in regard to preserving the town archives. Thus according to the Historical Manuscripts Commission the most ancient records of Weymouth and Melcombe Regis were removed from a "stable in which they were deposited as so much rubbish;" and so escaped the "house-maid and the fire-grate, to whose tender mercies a considerable portion of them had been already consigned." It is also noteworthy that neither the general nor the local historians have made much intelligent use of the town records.

The bibliography itself is divided into two parts. The first part, comprising numbers 1 to 919, is classified as follows in fourteen categories: bibliographies and catalogues (nos. 1-43); general public records (nos. 44-77); general municipal histories (nos. 78-94); the Roman and Anglo-Saxon periods (nos. 95-117); the later Middle Ages, 1066-1500 (nos. 118-148); modern times, 1500-1800 (nos. 149-169); nineteenth century: municipal reform (nos. 170-284*); parliamentary history (nos. 285-527); guilds (nos. 528-567); county histories (nos. 568-676); the Cinque Ports (nos. 677-705); Ireland (nos. 706-754); Scotland (nos. 755-893); miscellaneous—England and Wales (nos. 894-919). The second part relates to the literature and records of particular towns, the arrangement being alphabetical from Aberdeen to Youghal (nos. 920-3092). Some idea of the scope of the work may be gained from the fact that more than four hundred cities, boroughs, and towns are dealt with in this division.

Dr. Gross's book ought to stimulate and greatly aid in organizing the scientific study of municipal history in both America and Great Britain. Here is a vast field for research. The institutional development of hundreds of individual towns is yet to be traced; and perhaps some time we may have a general constitutional history of English boroughs. The last-named task can fall into no safer hands than those of the editor of the *Coroner's Rolls* and the author of the *Merchant Gild*.

GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD.

History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1660. By SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER. Vol. II., 1651-1654. (London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co. 1897. Pp. xxii, 503.)

MR. GARDINER's last volume, being the second of his history of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, maintains the character of the series, which as a work of research into the annals of this period is admirable and is likely to be final. The materials unhappily are meagre. There is no good writer of memoirs; no Pepys or Horace Walpole, to

hold up for us the mirror to that momentous time. But all that there was to be gleaned, whether from English or foreign sources, Mr. Gardiner seems with indefatigable industry to have brought together. His judgment is always calm and fair, whether you happen entirely to agree with him in the particular case or not.

His first chapter deals with the phenomena of opinion at the time of the transition from the Commonwealth to the Protectorate. He sees in it a general tendency to reaction. In the case of Hobbes this is clear. Never was a philosophy more manifestly the offspring of circumstance than that of the author of the *Leviathan*. Hobbes recoils from the religious zeal of the Puritans as well as from their love of political liberty; for though it would be difficult to substantiate the charge of speculative atheism levelled against the writer in his own time, no philosophy can be practically more atheistic than one which treats religion as an engine of state. Hobbes is in both his aspects the prophet of the Restoration. Mr. Gardiner sees reaction against Puritan individualism even in the Utopias, such as that of Winstanley, designated by him as "the most thoughtful of all the Diggers who had attempted to establish community of property." "Not only kings but lords of the manor, lawyers, landlords, and a tithe-supported clergy were to vanish from the face of the country, and in the place of the existing life of competition was to be established a collectivist society in which all worked under the superintendence of elected overseers for the good of all." No money was to be admitted in that commonwealth. So there were Bellamys before Bellamy.

Passing to Ireland Mr. Gardiner describes the closing scene of that hideous struggle of races for the land, not failing to do justice to the comparative humanity of Ireton. His view of the Irish policy of the Commonwealth and Protectorate is adverse. He thinks that it gave birth to a hostile Irish nationality by its oppression of the Irish religion.

"It was this steady growth of Irish national feeling which constituted the real difficulty of the conquerors. Merely to deal with the murderers of 1641, or even with the leaders of the insurrection which followed, would have been comparatively an easy task. The murders and the insurrection were but an episode in the deplorable history of that long strife of which Englishmen took little heed. It was only in the nature of things that England should set herself against the establishment of a hostile nation in Ireland; only in the nature of things that her attempt to hinder it by main force should be the fruitful source of unnumbered miseries. It was no longer possible to resort to the intelligent policy of Henry VIII., and to govern Ireland by rulers developed within herself. Mary, Elizabeth, James, and Strafford had struck another note, each time with increasing emphasis. The Commonwealth, in its own conceit so innovating, could find no other way than to tread in the steps of its immediate predecessors."

What other course could the Commonwealth have taken? It could not have ejected the conquering race, the race of its own blood and religion, in the hour of hard-won victory. It could not have fused the two races by its fiat. It could not have constructed political institutions under which the two races would have lived in brotherly union. It

could not have encouraged the development of a Celtic and Catholic nationality with a great Saxon and Protestant colony in its flank. It took what surely was not only the natural but the right course in bringing both races by a union with England and Scotland under the rule of an Imperial Parliament. It gave Ireland free trade with England and her colonies, the want of which was, fully as much as anything else, the source of her subsequent miseries. Cromwell proclaimed freedom of conscience. Practical freedom of worship would probably have followed. The penal code was not the work of the Commonwealth, it was the consequence of the attempt of the Catholics to extirpate the Protestants in the time of James II. Ireland was rid of the intrusive Anglican establishment. Clarendon, a most unwilling witness, testifies in his *Life* in the strongest terms to the material prosperity which was developed under the Commonwealth rule, and which, if limited at first to the domain of the dominant race, would in course of time have spread. The Irish nationality which in after times gave, and is still in some measure giving England trouble, was not that of the subject but that of the dominant race. To the dominant race Molyneux and Swift appealed. The Irish parliament which in the hour of Great Britain's weakness wrested from her legislative independence, was a Protestant parliament. The rebellion of 1798 had its birthplace in Belfast.

Mr. Gardiner in the passage above quoted speaks of the intelligent policy of Henry VIII., whom he credits with having governed Ireland by rulers developed within herself. Henry VII., just seated on a tottering throne, was compelled to try something of that kind, and said that if all Ireland could not govern the Earl of Kildare the Earl of Kildare must govern all Ireland. Nevertheless by Poynings's ordinance he brought the Irish parliament under the control of the English council. If Henry VIII. tried anything like a Home Rule policy at first, he soon found it impracticable; and if he did not push the conquest like his successors, it was because his forces were absorbed by his game of ambitious folly upon the Continent. He forced upon the Catholic people of Ireland his religious innovations, adding thereby to the flames of racial those of religious war. Any idea of developing a separate Irish nationality was surely foreign to his mind.

We have just seen another nationalist movement in Ireland collapse, the people having been satisfied by land-law reform, and once more it has been proved to us that the main object of contention was not the political relation but the land.

In the case of Scotland again, Mr. Gardiner seems to condemn the unionist policy of the Commonwealth on the same ground. He deems it an ill-judged and hopeless attempt to put an end to Scottish nationality. If the union was a good thing in 1707, why was it a bad thing in 1652? There was pressure in 1707 as well as in 1652, though it was that of commercial atrophy; there was even the threat of war. Scotland, or at least her dominant party, had twice, without the smallest provocation, made war upon the English Parliament. On the second occasion the Scotch

had proclaimed Charles II. king of England and had tried to force him upon the English Commonwealth with arms. On the first occasion Cromwell, having destroyed the Scotch army of invasion, abstained from counter-invasion and from any imposition of terms upon the vanquished and contented himself with an amicable settlement. Was he after Dunbar and Worcester to put the sword back into hostile hands and allow Scotch royalist enemies of the republic and Scotch Presbyterian enemies of religious independence to make a third attack upon the Commonwealth? If you condemn a policy you must be prepared with an alternative. The freedom of the Scotch people could hardly be extinguished for the simple reason that they had not really been free; they had been the serfs of a most lawless, oppressive, and barbarous aristocracy. It is clearly attested that for the first time in the tribunals of the Commonwealth they saw the face of impartial Justice. It is not less clearly attested that the period of the union was to Scotland one of unwonted prosperity, the natural consequence of free trade with England. It is apt to be forgotten that there were then two Scotlands, the Lowland and the Highland, totally different from each other in race and language, while the Lowland Scotland was absolutely identical in race and radically identical in language with northern England. The highland Scotland under Montrose had been waging ferocious war against the Lowland Scotland, and the Lowland Scotland had failed to subdue the Highland clans. Cromwell by the hand of Monck imposed peace upon the clans and was gradually introducing among them order and civilization. Religion was in a measure set free by the Independents from the iron domination of the Kirk, and witch-burning ceased. Provisional occupation by an army was inevitable, but the strictest discipline was maintained. It is difficult to believe that the common people when they had thoroughly tasted of a government of order, peace, justice, and free trade, would have been desperately bent on returning to heritable jurisdictions, courts which had no justice for "kinless loons," bands of manrent, commercial atrophy, and Highland raids.

Mr. Gardiner invokes the memory of Bannockburn. But since Bannockburn much had happened. The two sections of the Anglo-Saxon race, united by their Protestantism, had stood together against the Armada. The Scotch had themselves proposed to Elizabeth a Scotch marriage and a union of the kingdoms. The crowns, and to some extent the nations, had been united. Englishmen and Scotchmen had conquered together at Marston Moor. Is not the talk of Bannockburn after all rather modern, like the Highland costume which, in its present form, appears to have been the work of a tailor attached to the army of General Wade? This is an age of historical revivals and of the resurrection of racial feuds. Scotch character, as we now see it, is largely commercial, and so far as it is commercial its formation must be subsequent to the Union.

New light is thrown by Mr. Gardiner on the war with Holland, the cause of which he finds, not in the Navigation Act, but in the English practice of the old rule of war which made an enemy's goods liable to

capture on board neutral ships. Behind all was the insane desire which the ruling party in England had conceived of uniting the two Commonwealths. Mr. Gardiner shows the disadvantage at which the Dutch were, as the owners of an immense mercantile marine, exposed to English attack, while the mercantile marine of England was small. Tromp is his hero ; he rather disparages Blake. Blake was a student at Oxford till he was twenty-eight. He then became a politician and a soldier. He was fifty when he took command at sea. But it is not likely that the tradition of the British navy about the heroic father of its tactics is unfounded.

Mr. Gardiner is no doubt right in saying that Cromwell's ejection of the Long Parliament was popular. The Parliament had become selfish and corrupt, while its Dutch war had added to its financial embarrassments and forced it again to resort to confiscation. But the manner of the ejection and the insulting language addressed by Cromwell to men whose commission he held were most unwise and seem to show that he was not always master of himself.

Mr. Gardiner's account of the Barebones, or as he more respectfully calls it, the Nominative, Parliament, is nearly identical with that given by Mr. Masson, whose history, excellent if it were only disentangled from the biography of Milton, we must not forget in praising that of his successor. There was a conflict between a progressist and a moderate party. The progressists wanted not only to reform but to abolish the Court of Chancery and to do away with all state provision for the clergy. This was too much, and Cromwell had to give the word for abdication.

There followed the constitution embodied in the Instrument of Government. This Mr. Gardiner has duly analyzed. But we should like to see him compare its probable working, had it been allowed fairly to come into operation, with that of the party and cabinet system to which he seems to look forward as the ultimate and happy goal. He has pointed out that the Protector under the Instrument of Government was not absolute, but shared his power with the Council of State, and that inability always to carry the Council with him may account for some of his apparent vacillations.

Mr. Gardiner adheres to his view of Cromwell as a man of supreme ability and iron resolution in dealing with the actual situation ; but as rather led by events than shaping them and without a determinate plan. Cromwell's original motive for taking arms had been rather religious than political. He was not a revolutionist or in principle a republican. He was always working back to something like the old constitution purged of the Stuart abuses, with a religious liberty for all Protestants and large measures of practical reform. He owed his power to the army and held it by the sword. This, Mr. Gardiner truly says, was his weakness ; yet it is always to be borne in mind that no man could be farther than Cromwell from desiring to be a military despot, that circumstances compelled him, in Marvell's words, "still to keep the sword erect," that his use of the army as the support of his government was purely pro-

visional, while the army itself was not a praetorian guard, but a political party in arms; for the political character had extended to the whole of it, whatever its original composition may have been. An obstacle to general acquiescence in Cromwell's government not less serious than its military origin was its origin in regicide. The effect of *Eikon Basiliké* had been tremendous. Had Charles I., instead of being beheaded, been forced to abdicate or formally deposed and let go, he might not have been much more formidable at Breda than James II. was at St. Germain. But no cavalier, not even any monarchist Presbyterian, could acquiesce in a regicide protectorate. What boundless fury the execution of the king had kindled was seen when a man so respectable as Clarendon could countenance conspiracies for the murder of the Protector.

Cromwell's foreign policy evidently was a union of the Protestant powers under his leadership, he taking the place held by Gustavus Adolphus and by the great Protestant statesmen in the council of Elizabeth. This Mr. Gardiner thinks was an anachronism, the era of religious war having been closed by the treaty of Westphalia. But the Protestants of Savoy and France were still in need, those of Savoy were sorely in need, of a protector. Louis XIV. and the revocation of the Edict were still to come. Mr. Gardiner says that Spain had burnt her last Protestant. But Lord Stanhope witnessed an *auto-da-fé* including heretics as well as Jews on a hideous scale in Majorca in 1691, and it is believed that even in the beginning of the present century there was an *auto-da-fé* in Mexico.

The Protector's conduct in making war on Spain without definite cause or a regular declaration seems clearly to deserve Mr. Gardiner's censure. It could be explained only on the principle, practised by Spain herself, of no peace beyond the line, coupled with the notion that she was the Apollyon against whom Christian was bound always to war. Alliance with France, who was at war with Spain, Cromwell thought would enable him to protect the Huguenots.

There is a remarkable passage in the chapter comprising the negotiations about Dunkirk. "In our day a proposal to occupy a fortified post on the opposite side of the Channel and therefore assailable by Continental armies, would be reprobated by all Englishmen without distinction of parties as a wilful throwing away the advantage of the moat placed by nature round the island state." It is curious to see how deeply rooted is the idea that the British realm is an island and enjoys insular security from attack. On the American continent alone Great Britain has now an open frontier longer than that of any other military power, and instead of enjoying insular security from attack she is assailable in every part of the globe, while she is so far from being self-contained that a few weeks of blockade might reduce her people to famine.

GOLDWIN SMITH.